Kastrup's argument adapted to support dualism:
Facts 1, 2, 3, and 4 do not disprove dualism. Fact 1 puts pressure on dualism but only if dualism is narrowly understood. If we broaden our understanding, we see that a tight correlation between body and mind could be causally linked to a third thing, such as the Tao, or could be causally linked such that body causes mind phenomena, or such that mind causes body phenomena, or such that each causes phenomena in the other. However, the dualism proposition seems not to be parsimonious, since it entails two or even three things. A failure of explanatory power has never been dualism's problem. Dualism's problem has always been a failure of parsimony.
Facts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 do not disprove or even put pressure on dualism. But the parsimony problem persists. Monism is the most parsimonious model if it stands up to scrutiny.
The competing monisms are physicalism and idealism. Physicalism is ridiculous since my perceptions, thoughts, and emotions are obviously not physical. They tightly correlate with brain states, which are physical, but tight correlation is not identity. Idealism seems equally ridiculous, since pebbles, raindrops, and splinters are obviously not perceptions, thoughts, or emotions as we understand them. Kastrup argues that pebbles, raindrops, and splinters are thoughts of Universal Mind (he doesn't call it Universal Mind). But the only reason for accepting this proposition is that it supports a parsimonious model; I.e., there is only Universal Mind having experiences. But is it parsimonious to ask us to accept that pebbles, raindrops, and splinters are the thoughts of Universal Mind?
For the sake of parsimony, then, Kastrup posits his Inferences.
#1 - Experiencer and experience are of the same essential nature. Let experiencer be mind as we know it and this works fine from a dualistic perspective. Mind is the water and experience is the ripples in the water.
#2 - Experiencer is an ontological primitive. Let experiencer be mind as we know it and this works fine from a dualistic perspective.
#3 - Experiencer is associated with the entire universe. Kastrup explains this by arguing that every mind as we know it is an alter of Universal Mind. This works fine form a dualistic perspective.
#4 - Living organisms are alters of Universal Mind. All living organisms. OK. This works fine from a dualistic perspective.
#5 - Metabolizing organisms are the extrinsic appearance of the alters of Universal Mind. Here we've moved beyond dualism. But we only did it because Kastrup's monism demands it, and we're only entertaining Kastrup's monism because of its alleged parsimony. Dualism doesn't require Inference #5 to be true, and that in itself is a kind of parsimony.
#6 - The perceptions of an alter are responsive to the thoughts (and only the thoughts) of the prime manifestation of Universal Mind. We're beyond dualism here, but we're only entertaining Kastrup's monism because of its parsimony. Dualism doesn't require Inference #6 to be true, and that in itself is a kind of parsimony.
In the end, I must ask myself the question of whether Kastrup's monism is more or less parimonious than dualism. Whatever I decide, this article has caused me to think this thought: "If we broaden our understanding, we see that a tight correlation between body and mind could be causally linked to a third thing, such as the Tao, or could be causally linked such that body causes mind phenomena, or such that mind causes body phenomena, or such that each causes phenomena in the other."
What if I were to throw parsimony to the wolves? I would then choose the model I find most intriguing, which is a triplistic one. I am three bodies: physical body, mental body, and what I'll now call Tao-body. But I got a new thought from Kastrup. What if the physical and mental bodies are tightly correlated because they're both causally linked to the Tao-body? What if Tao-bodies are the prime movers and the other two bodies are secondary and contingent?